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X The  provisional  agenda  for  the  Sixth  Session  of  the  United  Nations 
Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  was  adopted  at  the  24th  meeting  of 
the  Trade  and  Development  Board  (TDB)  in  July  1982,  despite  the 
opposition  of  the  United  States. 
The  United  States  Delegation  has,  however,  stated its readiness,  in  the 
OECD  North-South  Working  Party,  to  cooperate  with  its Group  B partners 
in  seeking  a  common  approach  to  th~ problems  with  which  the  Conference 
will  be  faced. 
With  a  view  to  the establishment  of  a  Community  position for  the  debate, 
initially within  Group  B and  subsequently  in  the  UNCTAD  preparatory 
committees,  the  Commission  is proposing  to  the  Council  the  guidelines 
sketched  out  below.  In  so  doing,  the  Commission  would  like  the  Community 
to  be  able  to put  forward  its position  as  soon  as  possible,  in particular 
so  that  it will  be  known  when  the  ministerial  meeting  of  the Group  of  77 
is  held  in  Buenos  Aires  in  March  1983. CONTENTS 
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17 I.  THE  DANGERS  TO  BE  ANTICIPATED 
UNCTAD  VI  will  take place  in Belgrade  fron1  6  June  to  1  July 1983,  some 
six  ~onths after the  GATT  Minister'ial  Mee1ing  and  some  three  months 
after  the  ministerial  meeting  whi1:h  the  Gr·oup  of  77  plans  to  hold  in 
Buenos  Aires  in  March. 
UNCTAD  VI  will  probably  be  the  on'y major  meeting  of  1983  at  which  it 
will  be  possible for  most  themes  of  the  Nc·rth-South  Dialogue  to be 
examined  comprehensively  by  all  the  members  of  the  international  community, 
the  major  items  being  international  trade,  raw  materials,  and  mone~ary 
and  financial  questions  (see  agenda  in  Anr.exes  1  and  2). 
The  Belgrade  Conference  will  take  place  ir·  circumstances  that  will differ 
appreciably  from  those  of  previous  UNCTAD  session  and  will  influence  the 
positions  and  attitudes  of  all  the  participants,  given  that  the  crisis 
is hitting all  the  participants hard,  frorr  the  north  and  the  south  alike, 
and  is  no  longer  considered  a  passing  pheromenon.  As  a  result,  this 
Conference  will  offer a  unique  opportunit),  at  least potentially, to 
relaunch  international  cooperation  which,  though  more  necessary  than  ever 
today,  seems  increasingly  to  be  blocked  b)  the  crisis. 
Hence,  too,  the  dangers  overhanging  UNCTAt  VI:  disappointed  expectations 
or  increased  frustration.  Those  dangers  Ere  considerable. 
Because  of  the  seriousness  and  persistencf  of  the  crisis it is to be 
expected  that  : 
i)  the  developing  countries  will  step  u~  their demands  and  their 
appeal  for  international  cooperation,  if  only  to  help  them  to 
cope  with  the  most  urgent  problems,  ~hich threaten  the  continued 
development  of  some  and  for  many  others  put  at  risk  their social 
stability or  even  the  survivial  of  their population; - 2  -
ii)  the  industrialized countries  will  re~tat~ the  constraints 
standing  in  the  way  of  the  s~arch for  ani  icceptance  of 
solutions  involving  substantial  new  con:essions,  notably 
in  the  areas  of  public  financing  and  the  opening-up  of 
their markets. 
Against  this  background,  UNCTAD  VI  is  in  cang·?r  itself of  being  bogged 
down  in  the  same  way  as  the  existing machinert  for  international 
coordination  and  the  mechanisms  being  set  up.  This,  at  a  time  when 
such  coordination  is  more  necessary  than  ever. 
Sorely  tested  by  the  crisis,  it  is  becoming  ir1creasingly difficult  for 
the  existing machinery  to  cope  with  the stres ;es  and  strains  engendered 
by  it  - in  either the  North-North  or  the  NJrt:,-south  context.  The 
preparations  for  the  GATT  Ministerial  Meeting  were  an  example  of  this, 
and  the  phenomenon  is  similar  with  regard  to  inancial  anrl  monetary 
matters. 
Unless  this  situation  is  remedied,  it  can  ·)nl ·  set  back  f11rther  those 
members  of  the  international  community  that  a ·e  the  most  vulnerable 
to  the  effects  of  the  crisis  and  have  very  li  tle possibi 1ity of 
falling  back  on  purely  national  solutions  ro  heir  diffic11lties. 
The  Belgrade  meeting  runs  the  risk  therefo~e  unless  appropriate  action 
is  taken  in  good  time  by  the  Community  and  Gr,·up  B- of  n·presenting 
nothing  more  to  the  Group  of  77  than  a  forum  ·or the  expression  and 
repetition of  unsatisfied  global  demands. 
The  Community  and  the  Group  B countries  wi~l  · onsequently  have  a  heavy 
responsibility to  bear  in  Belgrade.  They  ~an  help  UNCTAD  to  set  itself 
concrete,  realistic  objectives  once  again,  wh  ch  will  be  1he  subject  of 
negotiations  over  the  next  four  or  five  ye~rs.  to  focus  its area  of 
activities  more  specifically and  to  adapt  its means  of  action  to  the 
changed  context  of  the  1980s. - 3  -
II.  THE  BACKGROUND  TO  UNCTAD  VI 
The  UNCTAD  agenda  and  the  most  recent  dis :us~ ions  wi thir,  :he  TDB  show 
that  there  are  no  clear  ideas  as  to  UNCTA:l's  future  work.  In  addition,-
there  is  no  longer  any  real  project  in  th'~  p·peline  on  a  oar  with 
earlier examples  such  as  the  Gene··alized  ·;ys~ em  of  Prefer•.!nces,  the 
Integrated  Programme  or  the  negotiations  •>n  1he  developin 1 countries' 
debt. 
This  loss  of  dynamism  is  doubtle ,s  due  l.1rg1  ly  to  the  pr.•found  change~. 
that  have  taken  place  in  the  worl:i  econom  c  1 limate.  ThEJe  is  a 
widespread  feeling  that  certain  paths  exp  ortd  in  the  pa~r  are  now 
blocked,  that  the  old  recipes  have  Little  le· t  to  recommfnd  them  and 
that  certain approaches  are  now  out  of  da· e. 
Wh~n making  any  pronouncement  concerning  !INC.  AD's  future  tasks  one  mus< 
beilr  in  mind  three  major  changes  ~hat  hav•·  t<  ken  place  ir•  the  world 
eC•)nomy. 
1.  At  the  time  of  the  first  few  'JNCTAD  s•·ss· ons,  when  er crgy  was 
available at  a  decreasing  rea!  cost,  1 on: tant  CJrowth  !."If  world 
trade  was  taken  for  granted. 
The  problem  faced  at  that  time  was  how  tc  adapt  the  s;stem of 
international  economic  relations  to  prov·de  a  more  fc-uourable 
framework  for  the  genuine  int0gration of  the  developi  ;g  countries. 
All  the  dema.-ods  put  forward  b'l  the  de\·elt ping  countri 'S  under 
the  heading  .)f  the  new  international  t·cor·omic  order  s:ressed this 
central  theme. 
Although  the  organization  of  internation< l  economic  r:olations  is 
far  from  satisfactory at  the  present  1im£,  it  is  the  policies  of 
internal  adjustment  that  have  become  the  urgent  issue,  for  both 
the  developing  and  the  industrialized cotntries. - 4  -
For  many  developing  countries,  the  en•;rgy  crisis,  increased  food 
dependence  and  in  some  cases  repeated  debt  crises  have  served  as 
a  revelation,  demonstrating  the  unsui-ability  in  many  cases  of 
domestic  policies  in  the  new  internat  onal  context. 
Although  entitled "United  Nations  Con=erence  on  Trade  and 
Development",  UNCTAD  is  perhaps  obl i gr;d  today  to  give  to  the 
development  aspect- i.e.  the  efforts  to  adapt  domestic  policies 
to  this  new  context  and  the  support  tlrose  efforts deserve  to 
receive  from  external  sources  - the  ir1portance  that  was  hitherto 
given  to  the  trade  aspect  in  its anal:·ses  and  debates. 
2.  The  recession  in  the  world  economy  is  not  confined  to  a  Low  rate 
of  growth  in  production  and  trade  due  inter alia  to  stagnating 
consumption  in  the  industrialized  coUJrtries.  It also  involves 
profound  changes  in  the  geographical  ·:tructure  and  technology  of 
production. 
This  is  very  clear  in  the  industrial  ield,  mainly  on  account  of 
the  appearance  on  the  scene  of  the  n•·wly  industrializing  countries 
(NICs),  but  it  1s  also  apparent  in  th"  commodities  field  where,  with 
a  few  exceptions,  one  can  see  an  eros  on  of  the  market  shares  of 
traditional  producers  in  favour  of  mo  e  efficient  competitors  newly 
arrived  on  the  markets  or  - in  the  ca~.e  of  mining  products  - in 
favour  of  producer  countries  outside  ~he Third  World. 
Such  changes  make  it  necessary  to  SUP!•lement,  to  a  certain extent, 
the  traditional  approach  of trade  lib··ralization  conceived  almost 
exclusively  in  terms  of  concessions  f:om  the  North  to  the  South 
and  that  of  commodity  market  regulati••n  concentrating  excessively 
on  price  stabilization. - 5  -
3.  Lastly,  the  scale  and  distribution  of  financing  requirements  and 
financial  surpluses  have  themselves  undergone  profound  changes,  to 
which  the  international  financial  syst£'m  has  endeavoured  to  react 
instead of  really adaptir.g;  the  development  of official  funds  for 
regulating  and  intervention  fund.purpo~:es  has  not  kept  pace  with 
the  upsurge  of  private  flows. 
In  any  event,  the  scale  and  rature of  the  problems  to  be  tackled-
of  which  the  indebtedness  of  many  developing  countries  constitutes 
the  most  visible manifestation  - are  such  that  it  is  impossible  to 
deal  with  them  solely  in  terms  of  redLtribution  of  income  from 
the  industrialized to the  developing  countries,  except  for  those 
countries  which  are  in  practice  excludPd  from  the  international 
financial  system  precisely because  of  their poverty  and  are 
obliged  to  count  on  official  developmer1t  assistance for  some  easing 
of  the  external  constraints  on  them. 
* 
*  * 
This  brief analysis  of  the  economic  situat on- which  should  really  be 
accompanied  by  a  look  at  the  political  situation1  - can  help  us  to 
establish  the  main  chapter  headings  for  a  r:onsideration  of  the  guidelines 
which  UNCTAD  VI  could  set  for  the  future  work  of  the  organization,  it 
being  understood  that  their  common  purpose  must  be  to  bring about  in 
concert  the  manifold  internal  and  external  adjustments  that  are  essential 
if a  way  out  of  the  crisis  is  to  be  found. 
Considering  in  turn  the  problems  of  trade,  commodities  and  development 
funding,  this  Communication  sets  out  to  prrlpose  the  broad  guidelines  which 
the  Community  could  follow  in  the  preparatory  work  for  UNCTAD  VI.  These 
broad  guidelines  will  then  be  fleshed  out  n  greater detail  in  the 
specific  working  papers  further  to  this  Cor1munication  as  the  preparatory 
work  advances  in  the  Council,  in  the  OECD  framework  and  within  UNCTAD 
itself. 
1rt  must  be  remembered  that  the  political  situation accounts  for  a  very 
considerable drain  on  resources  (refugees,  victims  of  conflict,  etc.)  which 
would  otherwise  be  available  for  the  economic  and  social  development  of  the 
developing  countries. - 6  -
III.  THE  MAJOR  ISSUES  OF  UNCTAD  VI 
3.1  Trade 
UNCTAD  VI·is  __ b€1ng  prepared  at  a  time  when,  for  the  first  time  since  the 
'  _  __, ____ __.... 
thist-i-es,  there  has  been  a  decline  in  the  value  of  world  trade  from  one 
----y~ar to  the  next.  Unless  the  recession  gets  worse  and  is  prolonged,  with 
protectionist  pressures  increasing,  the  major  features  of  the  world  trading 
system  in  the  eighties  will  be  dominated  firstly by  the  dynamics  of  the 
process  of  economic  recovery  in  the  industrialized countries  and  by  the  way 
in  which  the  three major  trading  powers  (North  America,  Western  Europe  and 
Japan)  intend  to  manage  their  economic  and  trade  relations.  The  emergence 
of  the  NICs  is  another  factor  which  must  also  be  taken  into account. 
The  maintenance  of  an  open  multilateral  system  depends  on  the ability of  the 
trading  powers  to  control  the  consequences  of  the  recession,  to  revive  the 
world  economy  and  find  balanced  solutions  to  their trade differences. 
Although  not  fundamental,  the  North-South  aspects  of  this  problem  are 
nor.e  the  Less  important. 
In  the  seventies  the  trend  of  trade  was  marked  by  the  developing  countries' 
growing  participation  in  world  trade  in  manufactures,  which  was  reflected 
in  : 
i)  NICs'  dynamism,  expressed  through  the  steady  increase  in  their  exports 
and  the  wider  range  of  products  exported; 
ii)  the  emergence  of  a  new  wave  of  exporting  developing  countries,  in  Asia, 
Latin  America  and  the  Mediterranean  :  more  than  fifty  developing 
countries  today  export  significant  amounts,  against  half  that  figure 
in  the sixties; 
iii)  the  development  of  South-South  trade. - 7 -
Another  feature  was  the absence  of  many  developing  countries,  including 
the  LLDCs,  from  this  process  of  integration. 
In  this  context,  the  approach  to  North-South  trade  problems  adopted  in  the 
early seventies  (non-reciprocity,  non-differentiation  between  developing 
countries,  GSP)  must  be  reconsidered. 
Firstly,  because  the diversity of  regional  situations  and  the  increasingly 
differentiated  levels  of  the  developing  countries'  economic  development 
mean  that  solutions  must  be  tailored  to  spe~ific situations. 
Secondly,  the  progress  made  at  the  multilatPral  Level  on  tariff dismantling 
by  the  industrialized countries,  particularly the  Community,  mean  that 
tariff matters  are  of  relatively  secondary  ~mportance today;  the  main 
issue  is  that  of  the  conditions  governing  e~fective market  access. 
The  North-South  trade  problems  of  the eight'es therefore  vary according  to 
which  part  of  the  "South"  is  concerned  : 
For  the  most  industrialized  developing  couni ries  the  major  issue  is  complete 
integration  in  the  multilateral  trading  system,  with  all  the  attendant 
rights  and  responsibilities.  How  can  these  countries  be  brought,  without 
interrupting their momentum,  to adopt  economic,  industrial  and  trade 
strategies  more  compatible  with  the  maintenance  of  an  open  multilateral 
trading  system  (policy  on  the  division  of  national  revenue  between 
investment  and  consumption,  the  opening  up  c,f  their markets,  tariff 
dismantling,  etc.). 
For  Low- or  middle-income  developing  countr·y  exporters,  which  more  often 
than  not  have  sizeable  domestic  or  regional  markets  in  neighbouring  countries, 
the  example  of  the  NICs  (particularly those  in  Eastern  Asia,  whose  development 
was  initially based  on  export  strategies  aimed  at  the  industrialized 
countries)  cannot  be  followed  without  seriaL's  dangers.  The  choice  of 
appropriate  strategies - between  development  of  domestic  and  external 
markets,  between  South-North  trade  and  Sout~-South trade- is  therefore 
fundamental. - 8  -
For  countries  which  are  not  very  well  integrated  in  the  international 
trading  system,  particularly the  LLDCs,  the  problem  is  not  merely  one  of 
North-South  trade  arrangements.  There  is also  the  important  matter of 
starting up  an  industrial  process  which  is  not  only  competitive  in  world 
terms  but  is also,  above  aLL,  backed  up  by  a  reinforced  domestic  market  and 
agricultural  base.  The  important  thing  is  therefore to  seek  international 
measures  designed  to  promote  the processing  of  their commodities,  the 
establishment  of  regionat  common  markets,  and  so  on. 
From  this analysis,  two  key  ideas  emerge  for  the  Community 
1.  Ways  must  actively be  sought  of  promoting  the  development  of  South-South 
trade,  in  particular  by  putting  trade  relations  between  countries  in 
the  South  on  a  preferential  basis. 
2.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that,  in  the  period  of  intense  adjustment 
it is  currently going  thr0ugh,  the  Community,  which  is, and  intends  to 
remain,  the  trading entity  most  open  to  competing  imports  from  the 
developing  countries,  has  Limited  room  for  manoeuvre to achieve  further 
progress  in  the ·liberalization of  trade at  the multilateral  level. 
As  emphasized  in  the  Memorandum  on  the  Community's  development  policy,  the 
Community  must  respect  the  commitments  which  have  been  undertaken  within 
the  global  agreements  reached  with  a  number  of  developing  countries,  while 
at  the  same  time  endeavouring  to  widen  progressively the  network  of 
liberalized trade  to  other  regions  of  the  Third  World  according  to  the 
intensity of  the  economic  links  (exist~ng or  to .be  developed)  with  the 
various  developing  countries  or  groups  of  developing  countries  concerned. - 9  -
3.2  Commodities 
The  commodity  agreements  concluded  so  far,  despite  unqualified  support  from 
the  producer  developing  countries  and  the  attachment  to  them  of  many 
industrialized countries,  including  the  Community,  have  not  always  been 
able  to attain their principal  objective,  namely  that  of  stabilizing prices. 
This  in  1981  the  products  covered  by  such  agreements  - coffee,  cocoa,  rubber, 
tin,  sugar  - are  among  those  whose  prices  dropped  sharply,  just as  they  had 
risen  dramatically  in  the  period  1975-79,  although  it should  be  noted  that 
these  agreements  have  helped  Limit  the  fluctuations  considerably,  despite 
often  inadequate  resources. 
Furthermore,  although  a  new  type  of  agreement  has  been  signed  (jute)  and 
progress  made  on  certain other  commodities  (tea,  bananas,  hard  fibres, 
tropical  woods),  the  fact  remains  that  for  many  agricultural  or  mineral 
products  of  importance  to  world  trade  there is hardly  any  prospect  in the 
medium-term  of  international  agreements  being  concluded. 
Perhaps  the  time  has  come,  while  reaffirmi~g the  Community's  attachment  to 
the  Integrated  Programme  (conclusion  of  commodity  agreements  between 
producers  and  consumers,  establishment  of  a  Common  Fund),  to  re-examine 
the  content  and  machinery  of  these  agreements  in  the  light  of  the  experience 
gained,  of  the  trends  relating  to  the  geographical  distribution  of 
production  and  the  economy  of  the  products,  and  also  of  the  features 
peculiar  to  the  individual  commodity. - 10  -
Geographical  distribution of  activities 
The  seventies  were  marked  by  a  radical  worldwide  redistribution  of  raw 
material  production  and  export  activities. 
< 
The  industrialized countries'  growing  share  of  mineral  extraction  has 
generally  been  paralleled  by  a  decline  in  the  activity of  a  Large  number 
of  developing  countries  in  both  the  mining  sector  and  most  major  export 
crops.  Deterioration  of  the  machinery  of  production,  caused  by  inadequate 
investment,  competition  from  substitute products  and  competition  from  other 
Third  World  producers- all  these  factors  have  combined  to produce  a 
significant  decline  in  the  world  market  sh<~res of  traditional  exporter 
countries  (often a  decline  in  absolute  terns). 
In  the  case  of  these  countries  the  problem  is  therefore  to  reconstitute 
their production  and  export  capacities  by  -he  best  possible  combination  of 
external  official  (multilateral  or  bilater;,L)  or  private  fi~ancial assistance, 
national  development,  agricultural  and  min;ng  strategies,  and  international 
agreements  enabling  them  to  maintain  or  reqain  a  satisfactory share  of  the 
world  market. - 11  -
The  commodities 
It  is  in  the  case  of  the  major  tropical  products  (coffee,  cocoa,  tea,  sugar) 
that  the outlook  for  the  next  decade  is  gloomiest  as  regards  prices.  The 
policy of  extending plantations,  which  was  encouraged  by  the  high  prices  in 
the period  1975-79  has  Led  to  medium-term  surpluses  of  supply  over  demand. 
If this  fundamental  imbalance  persists,  it  is  clear that  the  international 
agreements  will  find  it difficult  to  prevent  prices  from  falling  in  real 
terms. 
The  international  community  should  therefore aim,  without  interfering with 
Long-term  market  trends,  to  Limit  erratic  fluctuations  to  a  greater extent, 
while  backing  up  the  agreements  with  machinery  enabling  those  countries 
which  are  most  dependent  on  exports  of  such  commodities  to  cope,  if need  be, 
with  a  drop  in their export  earnings  and,  more  generally,  to  increase  the 
added  value  of  their products  and  diversify their  product  base. 
In  the  case  of  mining  products,  the  basic  problem  is  the  fact  that  the 
developing  countries,  particularly those  in  Africa,  are  lagging  behind  with 
regard  to  investment.  The  international  community  should  therefore 
concentrate  mainly  on  seeking  ways  of  obtaining  adequate  financing  for  mining 
investment  in  the  developing  countries.  In  the  mutual  interest  of  the 
partners  concerned  investments  will  have  to  be  safeguarded  and  a  return  on 
them  assured  by  reducing  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  trend  of  prices 
for  mining  products. - 12  -
3.3  Financial  aspects  (including  the  problem  of  the  LLDCs) 
More  smoothly  functioning  arrangements  for  international  financing  and 
the  recycling of  capital  between  surplus  and  deficit  countries  (the  Latter 
being  the  category  into  ~hich the  bulk  of  non-oil  developing  countries 
fall)  are  an  essential  condition  for  a  return  to  growth,  first  of  all  for 
Third  World  countries  and~  following  from  that,  for  the  world  economy. 
Transfers  to  the  developi~g countries  must  not  only  be  sufficiently  large 
(the  volume  aspect)  but  must  also  make  a  net  contribution  to  the  countries 
concerned  in  terms  of  growth  and  development;  the  effects  of  inflows  on 
production,  saving  and  exports  must  more  than  compensate  for  the drain  on 
internal  resources  resulting  from  outflows  (interest  payments, 
repatriation  of  profits, etc.).  The  extent  to  which  transfers  are  put 
to  good  use,  i.e.  facilitate  the  necessary  structural  adjustments,  is 
crucial  in  this  respect,  as  are  the  financ'al  characteristics  of  transfers, 
notably  rates  of  interest  on  Loans. 
In  this  context  a  distinc~ion must  be  made  between  the  countries  mainly 
dependant  on  ODA  (Low-income  countries,  notably  the  LLDCs)  and  those  for 
which  financing  on  market herms  plays  a  key  role:  the  problems  - and  the 
solutions  - are  different~-;  n  each  case. 
,. 
Financing  problems  of  theiLDCs  (and  of  other  low-income  countries) 
These  countries  suffer  fro_in  structural  deficiencies  which  Limit  opportunities 
for  investment  providing  a  speedy  return.  Consequently,  they attract 
hardly  any  private  flows  and  are  almost  wholly  dependent  on  a  single  source 
of  financing,  namely  OOA.  In  practice,  the  volume  of  the  Latter  places  a 
ceiling on  their  imports,  investment  and,  indirectly,  their  growth  rates. - 13  -
The  LLDCs  and  other  Low-income  countries  are  the  first  casualties of  the 
current  trend to  reduce  overall  aid~  Only  a  substantial  increase  of  ODA 
to  these  countries  Cas  advocated,  so  far  as  the  LLDCs  are  concerned,  in 
the  guidelines  adopted  at  the·Paris  Conference)  can  help  them  to  avoid 
being  reduced  to  a  purely  marginal  role  in  the  world  economy  and  give  them 
a  chance  of  "taking off"  in  due  course.  For  this  reason  the  need  to 
increase  the  overall  amo_unt  of  ODA  and  to direct  it specifically to  the 
LLDCs  is  today  more  pr~ssing than  ever,  contrary to  the  current  tendency 
to  pay  greater attention  to  commercial  motives  in  the  choice  of  recipient 
countries  (mixed  credits). 
If  the  increased aid  is  not  to  be  open-ended  and  is  to  be  used  to best 
effect,  it  must  be  focused  on  the  most  serious  bottlenecks  (training, 
agriculture and  energy)  and  must  be  dovetailed  with  appropriate  internal 
policies  geared  to  struct~ral adjustment.  This  is  the  approach  that  is 
being  followed  in  the  food  strategies operation. 
In  this  context,  a  Leading  part  must  be  reserved  for  the  multilateral  aid 
institutions,  notably  IDA,  as  the  Latter  not  only  concentrates  on  poor 
countries  and  such  pri6rity sectors  as  agriculture  but  also  can  help  set 
in  train  structural  adjustment  programmes.  For  these  reasons,  it  is  a 
matter  of  the  utmost  priority that  IDA's  aid  capacity  be  strengthened or, 
at  the  very  least,  maintained. - 14  -
Financing  problems  of  middle-income  developing  countries 
In  the  second  half  of  the  preceding  decade  these  countries  more  or  less 
managed  to  keep  up  their  imports  and  growth  rates  by  resorting  to  bank 
borrowing  on  a  massive  scale,  but  today  the  situation  looks  quite 
different:  there  is  a  slowing-dowr  in  the  growth  of  credit  advanced  to 
the  developing  countries,  and  this  could  result,  when  allowance  is  made 
for  debt-servicing costs,  in  a  tendency  for  net  banking  flows  to dry  up. 
This  situation  is  explained  by  three  factors  which  have  repercussions  on 
the  indebtedness  of  the  developing  countries  and  affect  adversely their 
creditworthiness  and  borrowing  capacity  : 
i)  the  drop  in  the  real  return  on  capital  in  the  developing  countries, 
resulting  from  inadequate  internal  adjustment  and  also  from  an 
unfavourable  climate  (high  oil  costs,  Low  growth  and  protectionist 
pressures  in  the  industrialized countries,  and  so  on); 
ii)  the  restrictive,  anti-inflationary monetary  policies  pursued  by  the 
industrialized  countries,  especially  the  United  States,  which  result 
in  very  high  real  interest  rates  on  d~bts  denominated  mainly  in 
dollars; 
iii)  the  structure of  the  developing  countries'  debt,  which  increasingly 
consists  of  short-term  commitments,  r~sulting in  exceptionally  high 
refinancing  requirements. 
Hence,  any  increase  in  net  flows  of  bank  credit  to  the  middle-income 
developing  countries  depends  on  : 
i)  better prospects  for  growth  and  exports  in  the  countries  concerned, 
deriving  both  from  their  own  structural  adjustment  efforts  and 
improved  performance  of  the  w?rld  economy; 
ii)  a  drop  in  world  interest  rates  and  an  improvement  in  the  terms  of 
trade,  which  alone  can  in  the  short  tt•rm  restore  to  the  countries  in 
question  some  scope  for  manoeuvre  in  financial  terms; - 15  -
iii)  the possibility of  restheduling  the  developing  countries'  debt, 
shifting the  burden  to  longer-term  commitments; 
iv) ·  confidence  on  the  part  of  the  banking  community  in  the  capacity of 
the  world's  monetary authorities  to manage  any  debt  crises. 
It  is clear,  therefore,  that  a  satisfactory flow  of  transfers  of  resources 
to the  middle-income  developing  countries  presupposes  conditions  which  to 
a  large  extent  lie outside  the  financial  sphere  proper.  There  is  much 
that  can  be  done  in  the  financial  sphere,  however,  to  strengthen  the process 
as  regards  quantity  and  quality.  Possible  measures  in  this  connection  to 
provide  a  more  secure  climate  for  bank  flows  and  to direct  and  back  them 
up  were  spelled out  in  the  Commission  staff paper entitled "World  economic 
imbalances  and  financial  aspects.of  North-South  relations"  (SEC(81)509). 
Briefly,  they  boil  down  to the  general  guideline  increasingly  endorsed  by 
observers  of  the  international  financing  system:  the  banks  have  a  very 
important  part  to play  in  funding  the  develoPing  countries'  external 
deficit  and  they  must  be  helped  to  play this part,  while still shouldering 
their specific  responsibilities.  The  fact  remains  that  the  relative 
importance  of  bank  flows  has  grown  excessively  since  1974.  A bigger  role 
now  needs  to  be  allotted not  only to  more  st~ble forms  of  private capital 
(for example,  direct  investment)  but  also  to official  flows- mainly 
multilateral  and  non-concessionary- for  the  purpose  of  supporting 
structural  adjustment  policies. 
Progress  in  this  direction  is  essential 
i)  initially,  in  order  to  avoid  a  rush  to  indulge  in  sterile and 
dangerous  deflation,  the  inevitable  consequence  of  inadequate 
external  resources; 
ii)  in  the  longer  term,  in order  to  contribute  to  healthy  growth, 
uninterrupted  in  particular by  debt  crises. 
* 
*  * - 16  -
Generally  speaking,  although  it might  be  tempting  to  become  resigned  to 
seeing  aid efforts  stagnate,  or  even  contract,  because  of  the  recession, 
it  is  essential  on  the  contrary to  recognize  that  stagnation  is  itself 
a  source  of  the  appreciable  aggrGvation  of  the  world  recession  and  could 
soon  have  even  graver  consequences  if  the  trend  is  not  speedily  reversed. - 17-
IV.  A PLAN  FOR  UNCTAD 
The  question  to be  answered  concerns  the purpose  of  the  discussions  and 
negotiations  to be  held  in Belgrade  and  of  their follow-up  within  the 
UNCTAD  framework. 
The  basic  idea  behind  the  general  guidelines  proposed  above  is  a  conviction 
that  the  worsening  of  the  economic  situation of  the developing  countries 
and  the  increasing marginalization  of  the poorest  countries  is directly 
related to  the  persistence and  deepening  of  the  world  recession. 
Without  going  so  far  as  to maintain  that  recovery  will  come  through  the 
Third  World- since  the  way  out  of  the  crisis depends  first  of  all  on  the 
difficult  and  painful  structural  adjustments  that  are  in  progress  in  the 
industrialized countries- the  Community  should  endeavour  to  convince all 
its partners  in  the  industrial  world  of  the  urgent  need  to  relaunch 
N~r:h-South  ~~~oera!ion in  order  to  prevent  the difficulties  of  the  South 
Leading  tr.e  wor~d economy  intc  a  deep  depress;c,  and,  in  the  Lenger  cer~, 
to  find  ways  of  re-establishing,  to  the  mutual  benefit,  the  conditions 
that  will  permit  the-developing  countries  to  develop. 
It  is  in this spirit, and  this spirit alone,  that  it  would  be  possible to 
make  UNCTAD  VI  the occasion  for  a  joint  reflection  on  the crisis and  on 
ways  of  pulling out  of  it  together,  and  to  adopt  there  the  broad  guidelines 
to  be  followed  subsequently,  in  the  various  bodies  such  as  UNCTAD,  by  the 
North-South  negotiations  with  the  aim  of  facilitating  a  new  impetus  in  the 
development  of  production  and  trade  and  putting  a  stop  to  the  process  of 
marginalization  of  the  poorest. - 18  -
In  this  contcKt,  and  with  regard  to  the  future  role  of  UNCTAD  itself, it 
would  be  useful  if  a  practical  work  programme  could  be  drawn  up  at  the 
Sixth  Session  for  the  next  few  years. 
In  Belgrade,  the  industrial  world  must  impress  on  the  Group  of  77  the  need 
to  be  realistic  and  to  work  for  the  mutual  interest.  It  must  also  call  on 
the  Eastern-bloc  countries  to  demonstrate  a  greater  sense  of  their 
responsibilities  towards  the  developing  countries.  It  would  have  no 
chance  of  being  heard  if, against  its  own  interests,  it  were  only  to 
invoke  the difficulties  of  the  moment  in  order  to  put  off  the  necessary 
efforts until  a  Later  date. 